Dear Jack
As regards the concern you express - In the hypothetical you raise,
would the Court not simply say that an order against the sex worker
(e.g. for damages) would breach the purpose of the rule rendering the
purchase of sex work illegal and therefore could and should not be
made?

Kind regards

Ger

On 8/10/23, Jack Enman-Beech <jenmanbeech@gmail.com> wrote:
> A Small Claims Court in Nova Scotia ordered that a trick who had contracted
> for and received sex work services had to pay for them at the agreed
> rate: *Sheehan
> v Samuelson* 2023 NSSM 27
> <https://www.canlii.org/en/ns/nssm/doc/2023/2023nssm27/2023nssm27.html>.
> This is a remarkable case for several reasons, not least that it happened
> at all. The motivations of Samuelson in hiring a lawyer to defend this case
> in a public setting are unclear. There are jurisdictions where sex work is
> not in general illegal, and even in these cases like this one seem to be
> rare (eg, there is apparently no case law on point in the Netherlands*). A
> question for the group: does anybody on list know of any other case where a
> sex worker has sued for payment in a jurisdiction where sex work is totally
> or partially illegal? If so, please share. A brief discussion of this case
> follows.
>
> * Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, Chantal Mak & Zeeshan Mansoor, eds, *Immoral
>> Contracts in Europe* (Intersentia, 2020) at 119.
>
>
> The claimant is a registered tax-remitting business. In Canada only the
> purchase of sex work is illegal, roughly speaking. The claimant negotiated
> an agreement with Samuelson. Seven hours later he owed her about $2,100
> under their agreement. None of this was contested and (as the adjudicator,
> Pink, notes) if this weren't a case of sex work that would be the end of
> it.
>
> Pink decided that the contract was enforceable despite illegality because
> that is consistent with the policy behind the criminalization of purchasing
> sex work, *viz*. the protection of sex workers. In the alternative, Pink
> found that there would be a claim in restitution. At no point was the
> lurking other question considered: what are we to make of the sex worker's
> side of the bargain? If there is a contract, it might be that the provision
> of sex work can be consideration; and under unjust enrichment, a
> legally-cognizable benefit (Pink notes that the corresponding deprivation
> need not be 'giving' or 'submitting to' sex, but can simply be the sex
> worker's being indisposed for the duration). Both tend to the conclusion,
> perhaps odious, that a trick has a claim against a sex worker for services
> paid for but not received. There is no danger of such a claim being
> specifically enforced, but as a compensable claim it leads to a) the
> symbolic situation of the commodification of sex and b) the practical
> situation of a sex worker facing a potential damages order for not having
> sex (on top of the various pressures they already face). It would have
> perhaps been preferable for Pink to decide the case on a basis that
> explicitly rules out such results.
>
> Yours truly &c.,
> Dr John Enman-Beech
> Lecturer in the Law of Contract
> <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/people/john-enman-beech>
> King's College London, Dickson Poon School of Law
> <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/people/john-enman-beech>
>